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Engineering change? the idea of ‘the scheme’ in African irrigation 
 
Abstract 
Despite a growing recognition of the significance of farmer-led irrigation, externally engineered and 
induced schemes remain a popular model for irrigation development in sub-Saharan Africa. These 
have had a mixed record, and many have been widely critiqued. Nonetheless, schemes that were 
initiated under colonialism have been rehabilitated and new schemes are still being developed. This 
paper interrogates the continuing attraction of this model for irrigation, asking how and why it 
persists. Is the fact that engineering is so central to irrigation schemes another example of ‘high 
modernism’, as Scott might argue? Analysis of the history and current policy-making context of a 
new irrigation scheme in Malawi suggests a picture that is more complex, in which practical 
engineering considerations combine with narratives of modernisation and political imperatives to 
create momentum and lock-in. Understanding this, and why lessons from the past inadequately shape 
future-directed planning requires interrogation of the positionality of those involved, including state, 




Irrigation, schemes, development, Africa, Malawi 
 
Introduction 
In sub-Saharan Africa, farmer-led irrigation has been identified as an important and widespread 
practice (Woodhouse et al. 2016). Farmers have long been diverting rivers, growing crops in low-
lying wetlands, abstracting groundwater, and irrigating from mountain streams. Despite this, a strong 
narrative maintains that because sub-Saharan African irrigation is much less widespread than its 
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potential, especially when compared to Asia, there is a need for irrigation schemes that are initiated 
and supported by donors and governments (Oates et al. 2015). Both the World Bank and the FAO 
have stressed the need to tap underutilised potential through irrigation schemes, and the World Bank 
doubled its lending for irrigation between the periods 2000-2005 and 2006-2010, following a period 
when schemes had fallen out of favour (You et al. 2011). As Crow-Miller et al. (2017) have noted, 
there has been a resurgence of support for major infrastructure projects more generally among 
donors, including for irrigation (see also Blomkvist and Nilsson 2017). These developments are part 
of what has been characterised as the ‘New Green Revolution’ for sub-Saharan Africa (Patel 2013). 
 
Newly formulated national irrigation development strategies include the development of new 
irrigation schemes and the rehabilitation of old ones. Recent initiatives in Kenya are one illustration 
of this. Here, the government has recently announced major investments in the revitalisation of 
previously defunct schemes. The Hola scheme is about to be rehabilitated with World Bank 
investment. The Bura irrigation scheme, also in Kenya, which was first launched in 1977, and seen 
by some as a vast waste of money1 is also due for rehabilitation, this time with investment from the 
government of India. In Tanzania, the 2010 National Irrigation Policy suggests that there is 
considerable underutilised land that can be irrigated through improved schemes supported by donors. 
The Tanzanian National Irrigation Commission is charged with making this happen through the 
development of thousands of schemes. In Malawi, old schemes are being rehabilitated as part of the 
Green Belt Initiative, and the World Bank has recently approved the long awaited 42, 000 hectare 
Shire Valley Transformation Project (hereafter SVTP) – formerly the Shire Valley Irrigation Project 
                                                        
1 The data on this is contentious, but a recent estimate has put the cost of the scheme since inception 




(SVIP), in line with the government prioritisation of irrigation in its Malawi Growth and 
Development Strategy (MGDS).  
 
This paper is about this narrative of irrigation development through schemes and the interventions 
that accompany it. In particular, I ask how and why this model persists, despite extensive critique. I 
am specifically concerned with those schemes that are externally initiated and supported by both 
international donors and national governments. These are what have been called ‘irrigation factories’ 
– ‘state engineered attempts to modernise African agriculture’ (Veldwisch et al. 2009: 198; see also 
Bolding 2004, Diemer 1990) and have often involved elements of resettlement of farmers. In their 
classic overview of ‘Irrigation Development in Africa’ Moris and Thom (1990) noted that irrigation 
schemes are ‘designed from outside, externally financed (in many instances), and usually employ 
salaried staff’ (1990: 6). This is in line with Adams and Anderson’s (1988) observation that 
‘induced’ irrigation has been an important dimension of most schemes and that whether or not they 
have been induced by outsiders influenced how they then evolved2.  
 
Such schemes have been widely criticised, both in terms of their approach and their effects, which in 
turn contribute to failure (Bolding 2004, Chambers 1969, Moris and Thom 1990, Mwendera and 
Chilonda 2013, Veldwisch et.al 2009).  According to critics, they have romanticised and 
misunderstood the nature of communities (Chiroro and Harrison 2016), simplified gender relations 
and wrongly assumed households to be coherent economic units (Dey 1981, 1982, Hanger and Moris 
                                                        
2 The dichotomy between externally induced and ‘traditional’ irrigation obscures the fact that all 
irrigation schemes will include elements that are more or less induced. However, the important 
distinction here is between schemes that are primarily initiated by outsiders as opposed to those that 
are led by farmers, whether over a long period of time or more recently. 
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1973, Lecoutere 2011, Van Koppen and Hussein 2007, Webb 1991). They have classified as 
‘farmers’ people with only variable commitments to farming (Chambers and Moris 1973, Moris and 
Thom 1990), relied on imported ‘expertise’ at the expense of local knowledge, and involved land 
appropriations and dispossession (Ferguson and Mulwafu 2007, Mdee et al. 2014).  They have been 
mismanaged and collapsed (Bolding 2004; Mollinga and Bolding 2004). Yet, over a period of close 
to 100 years, with notable peaks and troughs and diverse efforts at reform, schemes have persisted as 
a model. 
 
In response to the apparent failures of irrigation schemes, there have been numerous attempts at 
‘reform’, often through changing the institutional arrangements for scheme management, alongside 
the rehabilitation of failed schemes (Mollinga and Bolding 2004). This is what Suhardiman and 
Giordano characterize as the cycle of ‘build, neglect, and rebuild’ (2014: 91). Changing institutional 
arrangements have included new approaches to the roles of state irrigation agencies, local level 
institutions and private sector companies. Such shifts have broadly followed shifts in development 
thinking more generally. Notable among these have been discourses that in different ways suggest a 
diminution of the role of the state. Thus, from the 1980s onwards, there has been an appreciation that 
farmers had been given insufficient say in the schemes of which they were an integral part, and this 
has resulted in a series of policy changes towards more participatory approaches. The development 
of policy principles such as Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) (Garces-Restrepo 2007, 
Suhardiman and Mollinga 2012) Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) (Allan 2006), 
and Participatory Irrigation Development (PID), in which farmers’ organisations such as water users’ 
associations (WUAs) have played an increasingly prominent role (Ostrom 1992, Venot 2014) are all 
part of this process.  For some commentators, such ideas reflect a genuine desire to ensure greater 
farmer control, based on principles of autonomy and empowerment (van Koppen et al. 2012, 
Muchara et al. 2014). For others, they are linked to a broader neoliberal questioning of the role of the 
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state, accompanied by a desire to minimize state expenditure.  In this, the responsibility for success 
and failure becomes located with farmers themselves - for example through an insistence that they 
form WUAs (Venot 2014). 
 
Alongside concerns with farmer control, narratives have also emphasised an enhanced role for the 
private sector and a movement away from models of failed ‘public sector’ led management. The 
concept of ‘public-private partnerships’ (PPPs) in development schemes is increasingly emphasised 
(Trier 2014). Recently, Lankford et al. (2016) have called for a ‘global irrigation compact’, in which 
‘…farmers and community leaders, government agencies, NGOs, private-sector entities and 
development partners commit to mutually create new leadership, partnership, ownership and learning 
arrangements’ (Lankford et al. 2016: 14)3.  
 
In this paper, rather than revisit in detail the reasons for apparent earlier failure, I aim to analyse why 
the model of the scheme has persisted and continues to do so. As an illustration of this, I focus on the 
new SVTP in Malawi as a case study of an irrigation scheme in the making. The SVTP raises 
questions that are relevant to the other schemes currently being developed or rehabilitated across 
SSA: to what extent does the past shape plans for the future?  How do politics and power play a part 
in momentum? The SVTP is a particularly interesting case as plans have evolved over many decades 
and have been documented in several studies, both historical and contemporary. Drawing on both 
primary data collected through ethnographic fieldwork and analysis of the written justification for its 
                                                        
3 Though not necessarily labelled as such, PPPs actually dating back at least to colonial times. For 
example, a British scheme in Nigeria in the 1950s involved a partnership between the Colonial 
Development Corporation and ‘A company’ (unnamed) which would provide the necessary capital 
of £450,000 (UK Colonial Office 1951). 
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development, alongside historical accounts of development in the Shire Valley itself, I ask what this 
case tells us about continuity and change, stressing that the intersecting perspectives and priorities of 
a range of institutional actors (donors, national agencies, private sector consultancies) is important.  
 
In the next section, before turning to the SVTP itself, I suggest an approach that focuses on the 
intersection between narratives and politics as revealing of power relations. The concept of ‘high 
modernism’ (Scott 1998) has been important in analysis of development schemes more generally, yet 
criticised for providing a somewhat simplified account of how power functions. Building on this 
critique, I argue that it is important to consider, not only how the justifications for schemes are 
influenced by engineering imperatives, but also how institutional and professional priorities come 
together to shape their momentum and ‘lock-in’ to the notion of the irrigation scheme.  I then 
consider how this plays out in the case of the SVTP.  
 
The model of the irrigation scheme: explaining persistence  
An extensive literature has interrogated how development orthodoxies persist and are sustained by 
narratives that reflect power4. Is the externally engineered irrigation scheme one of these orthodoxies 
and what are the narratives that sustain it? According to Roe, narratives strategically simplify, and 
yet persist through time, often despite evidence that might undermine them. Among these, ‘high 
modernist’ narratives have been a subject of particular criticism (Bahre and Lecocq 2007, Escobar 
1995, Mitchell 2002) – a criticism that has, in turn, contributed to a celebration of indigenous 
knowledge and ‘farmer first’ approaches (Pacey and Thrupp 1989, Sillitoe 1998).  Scott’s (1998) 
‘Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed’, has been 
                                                        
4 There are numerous examples. See Cornwall and Eade (2010), Fairhead and Leach (1997), Roe 
(1994), Venkatesan and Yarrow (2012) among many others.   
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particularly influential and is widely cited as one of the most trenchant critiques of high modernism 
(Bolding 2004, Li 2005, Reuss 2008). In Seeing Like a State, one chapter of the book focuses on an 
early incarnation of the SVIP in colonial Nyasaland as an especially clear example of the failure of 
high modernism. I will return to this account in my exploration of the evolution of the Shire Valley 
project below.   
 
Li (2005) has argued that, despite the overall persuasiveness of Scott’s arguments, Seeing Like a 
State takes insufficient account of the specificities of the interplay of power and resistance of 
different actors.  In particular, she draws attention to the significance of the many proponents of 
schemes beyond the state. These range from non-governmental organisations through to private 
sector companies, donor agencies, and individuals such as scientists and consultants. All are 
differently positioned – in terms of social standing, expertise, geographical location and so on. She 
suggests that understanding this positionality (and the ways in which it affects political stance), can 
‘bring a more complex field of meaning and action into view’ (2005: 385). I agree with this 
argument: as I will show, the ‘high modernist’ narrative that Scott recounts for Malawi – that of a 
straightforward example of ‘welfare colonialism’ - was actually more fragmented than this, and this 
continues to be the case in the contemporary context.  
 
One important element of positionality is the role of particular forms of expertise. Irrigation schemes 
are somewhat different to certain ‘high modernist’ schemes in that they are both grand plans to 
‘improve the human condition’ but are also entities that involve the construction of infrastructure, 
such as headworks, canals, dams and so on and the rearrangement of the of physical dimensions of 
rural areas (Crow-Miller et.al 2017). This points to the significance of the imperatives that are 
shaped by engineering (and engineers) and the ways in which these are embedded in the political and 
the social. Irrigation schemes combine both particular sets of technological expertise with the politics 
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associated with their maintenance, as well as the fact that the physical changes of dams, canals and 
so on bring with them social changes, including alterations to property relations (Coward 1986). As 
Molle et al. (2009a: 328) have argued, large-scale water resources development ‘has been a defining 
feature of the 20th Century’. This, they maintain, has been fueled by a combination of technological 
skill and innovation and a belief in the modernizing possibilities of such engineered change – a 
‘hydraulic mission’ (see also Allan 2006, Mollinga 2009). Such a mission is evident globally and has 
been widely critiqued. For example, in Thailand the extensive plans for the dry northeastern region 
of the country (Isaan) have been criticized for combining an over-optimistic account of their 
potential benefits with a failure to understand the social and environmental costs (Molle and Floch 
2008, Molle et al. 2009b).  In Africa, two of the most widely cited examples date back to the early 
20th Century; the Gezira irrigation scheme in the British Sudan and the Office du Niger in the French 
Sudan, each massive examples of engineered change whose evolution is described in detail by Ertsen 
(2006). As Ertsen argues, these schemes were based on modernizing narratives that assumed that the 
land on which they were constructed was basically empty, unused and without history.  
 
Thus, the engineering characteristics of irrigation schemes may well constitute an important driver of 
their development in their own right, and this is shaped by the professional priorities of those 
involved (Liebrand and Udas 2017, Mollinga 2003, Wade and Chambers 1980). The professional 
staff of irrigation bureaucracies still tend to be engineers (Suhardiman and Giordano 2014), which 
may lead to a tendency to focus on the technical in isolation from the social.  However, a dichotomy 
between engineers on the one hand, and social scientists on the other also obscures negotiation 
between differently positioned individuals and interest groups (see Koetsier 2014, Reuss 2008). It is 
likely therefore that there is more to the persistence of the scheme model than the simple dominance 
of engineering. Their champions will have important aspects of their personal and professional lives 
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invested in ensuring that schemes are carried through. Tracing and recording such motivations is not 
generally part of the discussion in the persistence of irrigation schemes5.  
 
As suggested above, and widely articulated elsewhere (e.g. Crewe and Harrison 1998, Mosse 2005, 
2011) the evolution of development projects does not follow a neat linear progress, prescribed by the 
nominal formal stages of ‘project cycles’. Like other forms of development projects, irrigation 
schemes are necessarily complex with a wide array of stakeholders. Nonetheless, as Chambers 
(1969) observed for the Mwea irrigation scheme in Kenya, they also tend to have a momentum, 
which he characterises as the ‘irreversibility of commitment’ (1969: 257). What shapes this 
irreversibility? For Mwea, it was caused by a combination of the personal drive of key individuals, 
the political wrangling between agriculturalists and engineers, and the momentum caused by these 
factors combined. Chambers argued that: ‘There is no point at which precisely it can be said that a 
decision was taken to implement the Scheme. Rather there was a rapid flow of events towards 
involvement and commitment’ (1969: 59).  
 
Chambers’ account of the development of the Mwea scheme is getting on for fifty years old, but the 
notion of the ‘irreversibility of commitment’ resonates with more recent accounts. As Moris and 
Thom (1990) found for projects in Nigeria and Kenya, there is a tendency for project implementation 
to speed up once donor funds become available. This was also identified in the case of the BVIS in 
Malawi (Veldwisch et al. 2009).  Technologies are thus embedded in both private and public 
institutions which contributes to ‘lock-in’ – a process in which private sector corporations, 
government bodies, local politicians, engineering and planning companies and consultancies, all 
have stakes in funds and sustain their stakes through narratives of national need, resource crisis or 
technology gap (Leach et al. 2010, Unruh 2010, Stirling 2015).   In the case of the SVTP, to which I 
                                                        
5 Two notable exceptions are Koetsier (2014) and Liebrand (2010), both for Nepal. 
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turn next, this concept of ‘lock-in’ may explain how narratives of national and local need have 
intersected with engineering imperatives over time and reveal how momentum is sustained in the 
face of both competing priorities and dissent from the dominant narrative.  
 
A scheme a long time in the making 
On 18th October 2017, the World Bank approved the funding of the SVTP. The agreement is for a 
programme that will cost a total of $235 million, of which $160m is from the World Bank, with 
contributions from the Government of Malawi, African Development Bank and the Global 
Environmental Facility. The programme covers an area of more than 40,000 hectares and will last for 
14 years. The overall objective is ‘to increase agricultural productivity and commercialization for 
targeted households in the Shire Valley; and to improve the sustainable management and utilization 
of natural resources’ (World Bank 2017a:1). Of its four components, the provision of irrigation via 
the Shire Valley Irrigation Project (SVIP) is by far the most significant, accounting for around 60% 
of the overall budget. The SVTP focuses on Chikwawa and Nsanje Districts, to the South of Lake 
Malawi. These are two of the poorest districts in the country, combining low agricultural 
productivity with natural disasters such as droughts and flooding. They also seen as having 
development potential both because of the pockets of wealth generated through sugar production and 
also because there are abundant water resources.  The SVIP will involve the construction of a water 
intake at Kapichira Falls and three main canals with a total length of about 133km. Other activities 
focus on strengthening land tenure and encouraging the commercialization of smallholder farming 
activity.  
According to the press release:  
‘The program will boost agricultural production, provide drinking water services, improve 
sustainable management of natural resources including wetlands and protected areas, while 
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enhancing tourism potential. “The rewards for this program will indeed be transformational 
for Malawi’s agriculture and the national economy,” said Joseph Mwanamvekha, Malawi’s 
Minister of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Water Development. “The beauty of the whole 
program is that it will engage the smallholder farmers to modernize and commercialize 
agriculture. We ultimately anticipate a half billion-dollar benefit to the economy.’ (World 
Bank 2017b). 
As I will outline next, this programme, especially its irrigation element, has been a very long time in 
the making, with origins that go back at least eighty years. In table 1, below, I summarise some of 
the key elements of its history as well as the sources from which I draw this. 
 
Table 1 here. 
 
My account arises from both secondary data and interaction with individuals involved in project 
development. Differing perspectives on how - and whether - the scheme should proceed are hinted at 
both in such documentation and informal interviews. The material on which this paper is based was 
gathered in the context of a research project that considered irrigation development in Malawi more 
generally and involved ethnographic fieldwork in Nsanje District, just south of the proposed SVIP 
(Chiroro 2015, Harrison and Chiroro 2016). The present account is based on observation and 
discussion at a conference on the prospects for the Shire Valley in November 2014, as well as 25 
formal interviews with key actors at both senior and more junior levels, representing government, 
donors, the private sector and civil society at country and district level. These interviews were 
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undertaken between October 2014 and June 2016 and lasted for between one and two hours6.  No 
World Bank staff in Washington DC were interviewed. 
 
‘Taming the unruly flows’: colonial and post-colonial planning 
The Shire River is the principal outlet to the south of Lake Malawi and the valley through which it 
flows has long been the subject of development aspiration. Back in the 1940s, this was partly seen as 
a matter of taming the ‘unruly flows’ (Welsh 2013, 2014) from Lake Malawi that resulted in 
sporadic flooding of large areas of farmland. But it was also about perceiving an opportunity to 
develop areas that were full of unrealised potential. In the 1940s, the Shire Valley Project was 
intended to be a centre-piece of British colonial planning for Nyasaland/Malawi. This is 
characterised by Scott in Seeing Like a State (1998: 226) as ‘welfare colonialism’, based on a 
complete faith in ‘scientific agriculture’ and a lack of faith in the agricultural capabilities of 
Africans. Drawing on Beinart’s (1985) study of planning for the lower Shire Valley, Scott argues 
that that this was largely a matter of the need for control and rendering ‘legible’ previously scattered 
residence and tenure arrangements. This had important aesthetic elements of order and regularity. 
The plans included a hydro-electric project, barrage, and irrigation infrastructure. Scott argues that 
the plans for the Shire Valley ‘failed almost completely’, largely because of farmer resistance to its 
numerous strictures. Meanwhile, the static and standardized model of the cultivators that was 
adopted failed to understand the great variability in agricultural strategies among farmers.  
 
Scott’s reading of Beinart’s study presents the Shire Valley Project as a clear case of ‘high 
modernism’ and scheme failure because of its misunderstanding of farmers.  However, this is not 
                                                        
6 These interviews and observations were carried out by both the author and Dr Canford Chiroro, the 
research officer for the project. 
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quite what Beinart argues, although misunderstanding of farmers is certainly an important part of the 
picture. Importantly, Beinart’s account identifies a somewhat disparate series of projects and 
initiatives, from conservation policies to resettlement and land use plans, as well as the proposed 
Shire Valley Project itself – the latter involving plans for irrigation and considerable infrastructure. 
However, while the conservation agriculture, land use and resettlement almost certainly failed, the 
SVP itself was in fact never implemented. Plans for irrigating the Valley came to nothing because of 
a combination of a lack of money and the political context of the time.  
 
Between 1940 and 1960, a range of different players had roles in devising the scheme. Thus, in the 
1940s, at least three different colonial officers conducted studies into the possibility of using the 
waters of the Shire for irrigation, and came up with divergent diagnoses of the problems and 
possibilities. Then in 1947, ‘the colonial government, thoroughly confused, plumped for a long term 
professional survey, even if the cost would be high’ (Beinart 1985: 129). A British consultant 
engineering firm, Halcrow, was eventually commissioned to undertake this. Its report of 1954 
suggested a project that would cost £78million, some 39 times more than had been suggested by one 
of the earlier studies. Supporters of this project suggested that it would revolutionise life of the 
Southern Province and importantly ‘put a cork in the bottle before it is too late’ (Beinart 1985: 133) 
– a reference to the supposed social and political strains of an area of increasing population and 
limited opportunity.  
 
In the end, it was the cost of the proposed project that turned out to be a significant barrier. Much of 
the drive for it had come from the Nyasaland government and its various civil servants, but the 
Colonial Office was much less ambitious in its aspirations. Politics also played a role and hopes that 
14 
 
funding might come from the Federal government7 also came to nothing, despite arguments made in 
support of this from Nyasaland. Eventually, the only element that was actually constructed was a 
temporary bund across the Shire river, which was breached in 1957, causing serious flooding. This 
event, combined with rising African opposition to agricultural schemes, led to even more caution in 
putting earlier plans into practice. Rather than a complete failure, the SVP of the 1940-1960s could 
thus be seen as a ‘damp squib’ (Beinart 1985: 139). Importantly, the fact that it did not get off the 
ground reflects, less the coherence of a state vision than the competing interests of a diverse set of 
groups and individuals, from consultancy firms, to universities, government technical officers, 
financial institutions – and the private sector. 
 
One key element of the proposed SVP had been the possibility of combining smallholder production 
with a sugar plantation in partnership with a private company. A test site was developed at Nchalo 
and discussions held with the multinational company Booker McConnell. By the mid 1950s, this was 
seen as one potential means of offsetting the considerable capital outlay required for the project. 
However, Booker McConnell withdrew from the project when it became apparent that the Federation 
would not meet its demands for tariff protection and guaranteed prices for sugar.  Subsequently, in 
1963, the London based firm of Lonrho decided to develop a sugar estate in the Nchalo area. Nearly 
12,000 acres of public land were then acquired from the newly independent Malawi government on a 
99 years lease. One of the objects of this was said to be ‘the economic stimulation of a rather 
backward and undeveloped part of the country, namely the lower Shire Valley’ (Amer and 
Hutcheson 1965: 11). Importantly, it was calculated that the scheme would contribute around 4% to 
the national GDP through its production of sugar for export. The resulting sugar estate at Nchalo, 
                                                        
7 The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland existed between 1953 and 1963 
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now under the ownership of Illovo, Africa’s largest sugar producer, has been at the centre of plans 
for the current SVIP. 
 
During the 1960s to the 1980s, The World Bank supported three phases of a major integrated rural 
development project in the Shire Valley, commencing in 1968, 1973 and 1978. A 1988 review of its 
rural development interventions in Africa (Mundial 1988), noted that in Malawi, ‘in technical terms 
there is a fairly large irrigation potential’ (Mundial 1988: 85). However, after 15 years, the 
production impact of the various projects had been ‘negligible’.  Blame was placed on both a failure 
on the part of government departments to maintain facilities and infrastructure, and on training 
benefiting already-successful farmers, traditional leaders and politicians. The study concluded that ‘It 
should be of concern to the Bank that past investments are deteriorating without proper maintenance 
and repair. This issue needs to be pursued forcefully and resolved, while, or preferably before, 
processing any new lending operations’ (Mundial 1988: 86).  
 
The 21st Century scheme 
In the 21st Century, various studies have been commissioned to assess the feasibility of developing a 
major irrigation scheme in the Shire Valley. These included consultancy studies in 2008 and 2011, 
the latter focusing on public-private partnership (PPP) options based on a possible relationship with 
Illovo Sugar (BRL Ingénierie 2011), a 2013 project appraisal report (ADB/AWF 2013), and in 
2016/7, a series of socio-economic and technical studies that culminated in the final project 
document, published on the World Bank website in September 2017 (World Bank 2017a).  This has 
significant differences from earlier plans, on which I will comment below. Importantly, during 
2016/7 the proposed Shire Valley Irrigation Project became the Shire Valley Transformation 




The drivers of the current plans involve a complex combination of stakeholders within the 
government, especially within the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development, as 
well as representatives of donor agencies, particularly the World Bank, but also the African 
Development Bank, FAO and IFAD. In addition, the private sector, most specifically in the form of 
Illovo Sugar, has for a long time been a key element of scheme design. Irrigation is a key element of 
Malawi’s Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) which has involved support to projects such 
as the Green Belt Initiative that sought to rehabilitate previously failed schemes8. As elsewhere in 
SSA, Malawi has a long and chequered history of state and donor supported irrigation schemes, 
many of which were built in the 1960s and 1970s and were beset by both technical and social 
failings (Chidanti Malunga 2009, Ferguson and Mulwafu 2007, Gwiyani-Nkhoma 2011, Veldwisch 
et.al 2009).  
 
In all of its 21st century articulations, rationales for the scheme have focused on poverty alleviation 
and national need, combined with modernisation and improved productivity. For example, an online 
news site quoted the World Bank Acting Country Manager saying: “We trust that through this 
project, Malawi’s agriculture will go beyond the food security agenda to commercial agricultural 
investments that will sustainably pull people out of poverty”9. The 2013 project information 
document (PID) (World Bank 2013) noted that there has long been an aspiration to develop irrigated 
agriculture in the Shire Valley, though without mentioning the series of interventions from the 
1960s-1980s. It stressed that: ‘The CAS [Malawi’s Country Assistance Strategy] recognizes the 
transformative potential of the proposed project in turning a poor and disaster-prone area into a high 
                                                        







productive growth pole with regional significance, and highlights the potential ability of the project 
to support commercialization and draw in much needed foreign investment’ (World Bank 2013: 5). 
 
The SVIP also became part of the general momentum, now enshrined in Malawian law, that supports 
the private sector in the development of irrigation, reflecting the trends discussed above. The 
dominant discourse is one of a celebration of the ‘private’ over the ‘public’, identified above, which 
is equated with the state, in line with ideas that emphasise choice, initiative and entrepreneurialism. 
Thus, while farmer participation continues to be portrayed as important, from the perspective of both 
the SVIP funders and the government, it was also intended to be an exemplar of the model of private 
partnership emphasised in the PPP bill of 2010. As the study that assessed public-private options put 
it: ‘…The development and management of these 23 200 hectares of irrigated fields clearly show 
that the greenbelt initiative and indeed the future of irrigation in Malawi is in the hands of the private 
sector’ (BRL Ingénierie 2011: 10). In this model, the private partner is envisaged to work with 
smallholders, organised into associations: ‘Smallholder farmers would organize themselves, through 
a highly participatory planning and development process, into consolidated blocks of irrigable land 
and commodity-based producer organizations in win-win partnerships with profitable value chains, 
including the provision of agricultural support services’ (ADB 2013: vi). 
The programme that was finally agreed in October 2017 is, as noted above, different in key respects 
from the plans of four years previously. Not only is it broader in its aspirations, being concerned with 
the ‘transformation’ of the whole of the Shire Valley in three ‘pillars’, of which the SVIP is an 
important first, but the proposed role of the private sector has also changed. There is continuity with 
earlier aspirations inasmuch as the programme ‘addresses the risk of monolithic state-driven 
development without room for private initiative that has been the hallmark of previous large-scale 
irrigation developments on the continent’ (World Bank 2017a: 28).  However, although there had 
been extensive investigation of the possibility of PPPs for the construction of the project, this was 
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eventually deemed to be not possible, largely due to a shortage of private investors. As a result, the 
Government of Malawi is to undertake the design and construction of the project through traditional 
public procurement.   
In addition, as noted, for a long time the project had been based on a rationale that revolved around 
the production of sugar for increased national income, in partnership with Illovo. As the 2013 PID 
notes: ‘The long term presence of Illovo with their knowledge, experience and interactions with the 
local farming community is seen as an opportunity for the project’ (ADB 2013: 7).  In the 2017 
documentation, this rationale has shifted towards one of protection against the impacts of climate 
change, particularly drought and floods, and increased food security through improved productivity. 
Although sugar is mentioned as a possible crop to be cultivated, this is modified by the caveat that 
Illovo does not at present have the capacity to process additional sugar. Illovo is still part of the 
project plans but it is noted that ‘Monoculture cropping would also present a risk, especially when it 
is linked to a single buyer. Therefore, the project promotes diversification and supports the trend by 
Illovo and outgrowers to shift to a partnership approach from a purely contractual approach’ (World 
Bank 2017a: 29). 
Managing dissent, presenting coherence and sustaining momentum 
The rationales for the project in its planning documentation and in media reports are overwhelmingly 
positive and generally cohesive. However, this is not to say that there is not dissent from the 
dominant narrative, including both speculation about its implications for those who are affected by it, 
as well as less public grumblings reflecting institutional and professional interests and suspicion of 
the consultation processes. For example, there was a sense among some traditional leaders that they 




Sometimes they bring one or two of us to these fancy hotels and feed us on fine food and drinks. 
Then they call is into their meetings in which they are the majority and we feel outnumbered and 
unable to engage with them, because the meetings are often in English. What meaningful 
argument can you make in such settings? If they want to engage with traditional leaders they 
need to come to the village and talk to us and our subjects (Traditional Authority spokesman, 
November 2014). 
 
Key issues are the implications of the changing property relations caused by the new project.  The 
project rationale includes the assumption that there is a need to formalise existing land tenure on the 
basis of the argument that the insecurity caused by customary tenure leads to poor productivity. In 
other irrigation contexts it has been established that altering and formalising property relations may 
work in the interests of those who are already more powerful (e.g. Cleaver 2012, Merrey et al. 2007). 
In the SVIP, a large proportion of the earmarked land is currently under customary tenure and 
administered by traditional authorities.  However, the relationship between this fact and either 
productivity or insecurity is at the very least disputed. Some within the Department of Irrigation 
warned of potential problems: ‘All that land along the Shire is land that is currently being utilised by 
small farmers’ (Key informant interview, November 2014). Others downplay the possible negative 
impacts. A senior government minister said that ‘No one will be asked to move. We may just have to 
change the arrangements a bit so that some people end up operating slightly larger fields’ (Key 
informant interview, December 2014). More strongly, a senior Irrigation Department official said: 
‘This is a government programme that is looking at the bigger picture and aiming to benefit the 
whole country and not just a few farmers… so it’s basically idle land that the government is 




The issues of land access and resettlement are dealt with in considerable detail in the background 
studies which support the final 2017 agreement. The Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) and 
Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP) of August 2017 (GOM 2017a, GOM 2017b), 
bring the findings of these together. The RPF establishes the principles which will underlie any 
necessary resettlement, though not the details of this, as these will be determined subsequently in 
Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs). The RPF notes the difficulty in anticipating the detail of the 
RAPs, not least because during there have recently been significant changes to Malawi’s land laws10 
and the full implications of these are not yet known. In addition, while the principles of the project 
have been agreed, the precise location of the irrigation canals, and hence who is likely to be affected, 
has not. The RPF sets out comprehensive procedures for allocating compensation to Project Affected 
Peoples (PAPs), alongside a Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM) for those who believe 
themselves to have been harmed by project activities, designed in line with principles developed by 
the World Bank and FAO. The GRM acknowledges that there is considerable anxiety among those 
who may be affected by the project, including fears of loss of land to the government or private 
investors. It is designed to address these through a series of committees, starting at Group Village 
level, and scaling up to the Area, District and National levels.  
 
The RPF is the result of extensive consultation, including around 250 focus groups and a (2015) 
survey of more than 1000 households. The background studies cover a wide range of issues, 
including economics and food security, gender, youth, agriculture, and land tenure. However, 
although land tenure is extensively discussed, and it is noted that both matrilineal and patrilineal 
inheritance systems exist within the scheme area, potential conflicts over land are not treated as 
                                                        
10 These include the Land Act, 2016, Customary Land Act, 2016, Lands Acquisition (Amendment) 
Act 2016, Land Survey Act, 2016.  
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significant. This is despite the fact that evidence from elsewhere in Malawi, for example Ferguson 
and Mulwafu’s (2007) study of two irrigation schemes, has found that local histories and practices 
are critical in shaping access to land and water. Importantly, the formalisation that has accompanied 
scheme development enabled local elites to capture resources. Ferguson and Mulwafu suggest that 
this problem is particularly acute in areas of matriliny (which is the case for large parts of the SVIP 
area) and that it can have negative effects on women’s control over land (see also Peters 2010).  
 
More generally, in the background studies and project documentation, existing research on the 
difficult history of irrigation schemes in Malawi is not cited. Rather, the possibility of conflict is 
addressed through the scheme’s formal Grievance Redress Mechanism, (GRM) mentioned above. In 
its formalised approach the GRM is based on an assumption that conflicts can be resolved through 
public discussion. While of course this may often be the case, this assumption entails a limited 
account of the ways in which power operates, where conflict may be latent and the interests of the 
less powerful suppressed. 
 
While there is little cause to doubt that considerable thought has gone into the land tenure 
dimensions of the project, such dimensions have also caused suspicion and concern and the legacy of 
this is likely to persist. Some informants speculated that the project would be a vehicle for the 
consolidation of the power of those who already had property and that only some voices were being 
listened to. The project appraisal document itself concedes that:  
 
While the benefits of such a transformation are potentially enormous, there are also 
significant associated risks that they could be diverted and captured by elites. Such risks 
could take a variety of typical forms. People better able to understand formal legal processes 
or with greater connections to political or economic capital may seek to manipulate the land 
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adjudication process and successfully lay claim to more than their share. Less sophisticated 
participants may be induced by local elites or outside speculators into ill-informed informal 
sales in advance of the land consolidation process (World Bank 2017a: 102).  
 
The SVTP has also developed in a context of competition between government departments which is 
not part of the picture of coherence that is presented in project documentation. In 2014, the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Food Security and the Ministry of Irrigation and Water Development merged to 
become the Ministry of Agriculture Irrigation and Water Development. Prior to this, their separation 
was seen as problematic, especially for those within the Ministry of Irrigation and Water 
Development, which was recognised as a lower status ministry11. For some informants, the merger 
was a positive step, as it would enable better coordination. As one donor employee explained:  
Donors are unlikely to have knowledge of what is happening at the level of the scheme – that 
coordination had to be managed by the Ministry of Irrigation, and it is a blessing in disguise 
now that the ministries of Agriculture and Irrigation have been combined. The tendency had 
been for different donors to report to different ministries and that led to confusion and 
competition (Employee of donor-funded project, December 2014).  
 
But others saw ministerial competition persisting, even with the revised structures, especially as, 
initially at least, the two Permanent Secretaries retained their positions. A senior district official 
suggested that ‘the recent merger of Irrigation and Agriculture will not change much; they are still 
separate, both structurally and spatially’ (Key informant interview, Dec 2014). This was also seen as 
a matter of capacity: ‘The weakest link in irrigation development has been the assumption that DOI 
will manage the coordination. The department does not have the capacity’. An employee of the 
                                                        
11 The terminology of ‘status’ was used by several informants, several of whom even specified the 
relative status of different departments (agiculture is ‘1’, whereas irrigation is ‘5’) 
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irrigation department observed that this also reflected professional priorities and training. ‘We still 
hope that our professional colleagues from agriculture will be more forthcoming in terms of their 
support to irrigation schemes’ (Department of Irrigation, senior official, June 2016).  At the local 
level, irrigation was closely linked to specific training and expertise. For example, when a new 
employee of the DOI was asked if he was the new irrigation officer, he corrected us, saying ‘I am the 
new irrigation engineer’.  
 
One ministerial official explained that: ‘Politics always plays a big role in irrigation. It is not always 
about what works, but about what fulfils the goals of politicians’ (Key informant interview, October 
2014). A range of informants also spoke of competition for resources.  An MP told us that: 
‘Ministries are in constant competition, especially Irrigation and Agriculture. They do not seem to 
like to work together, but rather compete on how much money or projects the other has’ (Member of 
Parliament, October 2014).  A district level official made a similar point: ‘Ministries compete with 
each other. The Ministry of Agriculture is using the number of irrigation schemes constructed as a 
measure of its success. They never seem to care about the quality of these schemes. There are too 
many schemes and these are competing for the same resources’ (District official, November 2014). 
The relationship between the government of Malawi and aid donors is also an important element of 
this, though beyond the scope of this paper. Some 40% of the national budget is funded by western 
foreign aid, which has been characterized by regular withdrawals and suspensions.  Meanwhile, 
‘emerging’ donors such as China are also playing an increasingly important role (Banik and 
Chasukwa 2016). As Anderson (2015) has suggested, such external financial inputs can result in 







The SVTP and the various plans that preceded it illustrate a particular narrative: that irrigation is best 
managed in schemes that necessitate external expertise, financing and engineering. Through such 
schemes, farmer productivity can be improved (or modernized) and development achieved. 
Examples of this narrative exist across SSA and are illustrated in plans for new and rehabilitated 
schemes in Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa, Malawi and elsewhere. Approaches to organising 
schemes may change, for example in the increased concern with farmer participation, but the notion 
of the induced ‘scheme’ has not. As Li (2005: 386) puts it, ‘certain kinds of solutions and problems 
become thinkable, whereas others are submerged’.  
 
My account of the new SVTP does not amount to a comprehensive picture of a project deeply riven 
by strife or necessarily going against the will of the people. I am suggesting something slightly 
different; that this scheme, which will change the lives of many thousands, has a momentum within 
which dissent and contestation are, if not always minimised, then at the least not seen as 
insurmountable. Potential grievances can always be redressed through a clear mechanism, and the 
vision of the scheme is presented as a coherent one. To return to the questions around which this 
paper was framed, why is this? What shapes the dominant narratives and how do considerations of 
political economy and power come to influence them?  Here, the ‘irreversibility of commitment’ is 
centrally important. As noted in the introduction, Veldwisch et al. (2009: 197) refer to the Bwanje 
Valley Irrigation Scheme, also in Malawi, as a case of ‘informed amnesia’. I would suggest that the 
scheme I have discussed here does not illustrate ‘informed amnesia’ so much as an imperative to 
look forward rather than backward. This is a reflection of approaches to planned intervention that are 





Returning to the idea of ‘lock-in’, discussed earlier, there has been a tendency for the ‘problem’ to be 
constructed as something for which the scheme is the necessary solution. This gives the scheme a 
momentum that appears to be irreversible, but which is a reflection of the interaction between a 
complex range of factors. There are important political economy dimensions contributing to this 
lock-in; schemes involve the commitments of large sums of money - money that is spent on the 
significant costs of building infrastructure, but also on the complex planning processes that go into 
their development. The fact that funding has recently been agreed for the SVTP, bringing together a 
coalition of funders, indicates that in some sense the time is right. In the same way that the failure to 
fund the 1950s scheme reflects the politics of the time, the success of its 21st Century incarnation is 
also likely to be partly a matter of politics. Colonial aspirations for the Shire Valley Project were 
frustrated because of a lack of funds, though money was invested in the planning process. For the 
SVTP, there has been an accumulation of investment in the project over many years - not just in 
terms of money (though this has been substantial), but reflecting a political will to see something 
through to fruition. In this, changes of direction and modifications of rationale might be possible, but 
abandoning the whole idea is not. 
 
In their discussion of the donor shaping of dominant narratives in Indonesia’s irrigation 
development, Suhardiman and Mollinga (2012) suggest that an analysis of the lock-in which focuses 
on the intersecting interests of national and international elites does not capture the full dynamics of 
the situation.  In their case, the dominant narratives of past decades are also important. This 
suggestion is also born out in the case of the SVTP, where history comes to shape the present in 
accounts that suggest the project has been ‘a long time in the making’, and thus desirable and 
inevitable. But such accounts overlook or ignore others that might lead to very different conclusions, 




Is this about the dominance of certain forms of expertise and the professionals that embody this 
expertise? As noted, earlier, there is an argument that an engineering imperative contributes to the 
gradually hegemonic nature of certain narratives (of under-utilisation of land, of the ‘potential’ for 
irrigation) that make schemes, once embarked upon, both necessary and irreversible (Bolding 2004, 
Diemer and Huibes 1996). The phenomenon is compounded by the authority, including authority 
over land that is provided by technological and engineering expertise. Beinart’s (1985) account of 
the ‘technical imagination’ of Colonial officers in Nyasaland supports this position. For SSA more 
generally, Bonneuil (2000) suggests that from the 1930-1970s, development planning was partly 
driven by the government scientists who saw vast potential in the rivers and under-utilised land of 
swathes of SSA. Today, narratives of under-utilised land persist, both in the case of the SVTP and 
more widely. For example, the World Bank report on the ‘Rising Global Interest in Farmland’ 
(Deininger et.al 2011), which has been critiqued as a source of justifications for ‘land grabs’ (Bues 
and Thesfeld 2012, Richardson 2010, Woodhouse 2012).  The authority for such claims increasingly 
lies in the data provided, for example, by GIS-based assessments, of the suitability of land for 
irrigation12. Such data, though important for mapping physical characteristics, are often disembedded 
from social and political context and based on assumptions about existing land usage that may 
involve a limited understanding of what people living there actually do with land (see Ferguson 
2013, Li 2013).  
There will also be broader political considerations of which contestation within government is one 
element, relationships with donors another, and engagement with the private sector a third. I have 
outlined some of the contestation within government above. When it comes to national politics, the 
specific competition between government departments plays a role and hints of this were evident in 
Malawi. This resonates with what Liebrand and Udas (2017: 134) found in Nepal, where irrigation 
                                                        
12 An example is the FAO Aquastats database. 
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engineers protected their profession vis-a-vis agriculturalists and fighting for their ‘mandate and 
reputation’ was important. The relationship with the private sector is clearly also an important 
element of the picture. This has been the case over many years but is changing as ideological 
positioning about the importance of public private partnerships is tempered by the practical realities 
of what is possible and feasible. So, while the present incarnation of the SVIP was initially strongly 
conceptualized as being about the private sector taking centre-stage, this was modified because of a 
lack of project partners and the apparent lack of private sector capacity to process sugar.  In the 
1950s, the lack of private investment was a contributing factor to the abandonment of the plans.  
 
Lastly, momentum is influenced by fragmentation: it is the result of the complexity of the component 
parts that go to make the scheme, which of necessity must then be simplified. The persistence of the 
model of schemes for irrigation development is thus not simply a matter of a failure to integrate 
social scientific with ‘technical’ understandings or the dominance of the latter over the former. 
Indeed, the SVTP was designed on the basis of, not only technical and engineering reports, but also 
detailed studies by social scientists.  Such background studies are essential elements of new scheme 
design. They collect detailed information, only some of which may be used in the project planning, 
and which does not alter the fundamental model of the scheme itself.  As a District official expressed 
it: ‘Once consultancy reports are gone through and approved, it is very difficult to enter any new and 
different views of the field situation. The focus is always on the scheme. That is what project funds 
are for’ (District official, November 2014).   
 
I noted at the beginning of this paper that farmer led irrigation has been increasingly recognised as a 
significant activity in SSA. As Woodhouse et.al (2016) have pointed out, this observation provides 
an alternative perspective to narratives that favour large scale public and private investments in 
irrigation. Such narratives characterise farmers’ initiatives as stagnant, unproductive and 
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unmodernised, and thus overlook what farmers actually do and underestimate the extent of irrigation 
practised. However, analysis here has shown that the model of the irrigation scheme persists because 
it has an enduring appeal and logic for its promoters. This is embedded in a political economy in 
which moving large sums of money, creating the visible and the visitable, and intervening in social 
relations such as land tenure is seen as both necessary and desirable.  To counteract this narrative, 
further research which questions its assumptions and explores the historical background through 
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Decade Key developments Sources 
1920s Sharpe, former governor of Nyasaland, suggests using 
waters of the Shire for Irrigation 
Sharpe (1921) 
1930s Increasing concern with ‘unruly flows’ of Lake Nyasa Welsh (2013, 2014) 
1940s Empire Cotton Growers Corporation-sponsored study 
recommends irrigation to control flow of water through the 
Shire Valley. 
Kanthack report suggests lake level can be stabilised with 
dam in upper Shire Valley, also with HEP. 
Reports by Griffin, Debenham on feasibility of agricultural 
development including irrigation 
1948 - Halcrow study initiated. Completed 1954. 





1950s Shire Valley Project proposed, including increasing the area 
of cultivable land by 100,000 acres through irrigation. Total 
cost of proposed project: £78 million. 
Sugar plantation plans initiated with Booker-McConnell 
(later withdrew because of lack of incentives). 
Temporary bund across Shire River constructed 1956, 
breached in 1957, contributing to abandonment of plans for 
project.  




1960s Large scale sugar plantation established at Nchalo,  Amer and Hutcheson (1965) 
1970s Plans for Kasinthula irrigation project, including diverting 




1980s Series of schemes for development in the Shire Valley, 
including irrigation. Evaluation says these had limited 
success 
1989. Land tenure study for large scale irrigation project 




World Bank (2013) 
1990s 1992. Feasibility study completed 
1997  Feasibility study updated  
CODA and Partners  
2000s 2000 Kapichira Dam completed (HEP generation) 
2008 Further update of 1992/1997 studies 
 
 
CODA and Partners (2008) 
2010s 2010 World Bank mission; 2011 Joint WB/AFB mission; 
2012, ADB mission; leading to 2013 SVIP project appraisal. 
2011 Study of public-private partnership options for SVIP. 
2013. Project information document published 
2015-7 series of background studies carried out in 
preparation for SVIP. These are not in the public domain, so 
not referenced here. Brought together into policy documents 
covering environmental, social, and resettlement aspects of 
the proposal, among others. 
 




BRL Ingenierie (2011) 





GOM (2017a, 2017b) 
 
World Bank (2017b) 
 
 
Table 1: The Evolution of the SVIP/SVTP 
